As the MTA’s project to bring communications-based train control to the L line continues apace, Transit is beginning its plan to bring CBTC to the 7 line. As The Post reported this morning, the MTA is now taking bids on the project to automate the IRT Flushing Line. Officials believe it will cost $348 million to complete this 6.5-year project.
According to The Post, the MTA hopes to have a contract signed by the end of the year. Getting this project set up for 2016 makes it better late than never. However, as Larry Littlefield noted in the Streetsblog comments earlier today, if this project costs $350 million just to implement, what will be the cost of maintenance and upkeep?
The article in The Post rehashes the various safety concerns that anti-CBTC (and generally anti-job elimination) groups have, and Transit responds. The reality is that CBTC, as implemented throughout the nation, is a safe alternative to human control and allows for more trains per line than human control does. Transit does not plan to eliminate drivers and has a built-in redundancy system as well.
Finally, as a postscript of sorts, Beth Stebner and Tom Namako end their article with what I consider to be an egregious quote. “It’s a great idea,” Anna Callahan, a rider on the 7, said. “But I’d rather those millions of dollars go toward lowering my fare.”
This is a prime example of my questioning those who cover the subway. Callahan has absolutely no idea what she is talking about here, and including her quote just serves to subtly and unnecessarily bash the MTA. While there is a real need for modern signal technology and train control, there’s no need for Callahan’s ill-informed opinion on it. That’s not helping the discourse.
21 comments
I wish the MTA was honest about this technology and not put the PR spin on it. The fact is that on the L line they were only able to add 1 extra rush hour train on according to the superintendent on the 7 they may not be able to add any extra rush hour trains. And the TA doesn’t trust the technology enough to allow it open and close the doors as it is designed to do yet in all of the interviews there PR team says that the computer will and does control the doors.
Whether you’re for or against this is it too much to ask for the truth about what hundreds of millions of dollars are actually going to get? And we all know that we can safely double that price by the time the system is implemented.
Talk about spin.
The R-160’s on the L don’t have CBTC yet (and I don’t think the CBTC is working on all the R-143’s). The trains without CBTC are relying on a temporary makeshift wayside signal system hobbled together out of the antique signals original to the line. It’s a miracle that they can run as many trains as they do.
On the trains that do have CBTC, ATO only went live a few months ago. There are still some flukes that need to be worked out. Perhaps not all functions are active yet (either because they’re still buggy or because the powers that be don’t want to test everything at the same time).
How about waiting until the system is fully up and running before declaring it a failure?
While the L’s CBTC system included the installation of countdown displays, you certainly don’t need it to install these displays. Many manual systems around the world have them… all you need is to set up a automatic radio signaling type system that communicates with nearby receivers.
I hope they are sure to check out this system that costs hundreds of millions of dollars to make sure it does not have any “anomolies” such as those on the Washington Metro. Recent tests on the L-train, where trains missed station platforms are not very encouraging.
Like some others, I am doubtful that this isn’t just a colossal waste of money right now. We aren’t even capable of running all the trains that are scheduled, let alone all the trains that could be scheduled now. I’m not against modernizing our ancient signals, but I am against extravagant spending on fancy new technology that brings only a modest benefit.
The signals on the 7 are old. They fail frequently. The entire system needs to be replaced – soon.
It can be replaced with a new conventional wayside signal system. Or it can be replaced with CBTC.
Either way, signal jobs are very, very expensive. (And disruptive to the riders.)
I don’t know the comparative costs. Is CBTC substantially more expensive than a brand new wayside signal system? If not, then CBTC seems like the obvious choice.
It’s too bad the existing signal system can’t stick around until the late 2020’s. (Or can it?) I have a feeling one of the more expensive components of this project is the installation of CBTC packages in cars that were never designed for CBTC. If the project could wait until it’s time to replace the R-62A’s anyway, their replacements could be ordered with CBTC included. (And, for that matter, in a more 11-car-friendly design than in the R-142’s.)
How much will the upgrades cost every couple of years?
How much does maintenance cost on wayside signals (which have moving parts and are in a dirty setting)?
Also – what is the expected life of a new signal system (wayside or CBTC)?
Ben, do you have a link to the RFP, rather than to an NY Post article talking about it? I’m interested to know who will be allowed to bid – the R188 RFP is open only for companies that made R142s and R142As, i.e. Kawasaki and Bombardier, which isn’t a competitive bidding process.
Alon: Check it out right here as a PDF. I glimpsed through it, and there doesn’t appear to be similar restrictions.
CBTC, at least in the form that NYCT is using it, is not installed pretty much anywhere else. There are a number of systems that use inductive loops for communication, but NYCT is almost the only one that managed to get an RF system to work (I think SEPTA might be the other one). BART tried and eventually gave up. The systems used on WMATA, BART, and PATCO are actually far simpler and have more in common with LIRR’s ASC than with CBTC.
The subway needs new signalling desperately because without it we won’t get any more service and the parts currently in use are so old that they can’t even be made anymore. Even if it’s gradual and for only one line, I’d rather see successful implementation rather than a quick and poorly executed one. It’s quite frustrating that the TWA strikes down any opportunities for OPTO to improve efficiency as well.
Unfortunately, there’s no way to fit more trains on the 7 line with CBTC, due to terminal restrictions and the three track merge before QBP.
You’re correct but the TA keeps telling that public that this technology will add more trains which is there main selling point. They are lying to the public as usual and getting away with it. I am very curious to see what the public thinkd if told the truth about this program.
Two issues are being conflated here.
CBTC is fundamentally a signal system. Rather than relying on (see http://www.nycsubway.org/tech/signals/ for the details) wayside signals and stop arms to enforce safe train separation based on fixed-length blocks and assuming, in most cases, that all trains are operating as fast as they can possibly go – an overly conservative approach that often keeps trains much farther apart than necessary (and, hence, reduces capacity) – a CBTC calculates how fast each train can safely go based on its location and its leader’s location (and, possibly, speed- I’m not sure about that). That speed is then relayed to the train.
That’s CBTC. Notice: No mention of whether the train is operated by a human or automatically.
It can be done either way (and on the Canarsie line, it’s done both ways). The safe speed can be shown to a human train operator, who proceeds to operate the train in accordance with the CBTC system’s instructions, or the train can be instructed to simply operate itself at the fastest possible safe speed.
CBTC is not the same thing as ATO. Trains in a CBTC system can be operated manually or automatically. And, for that matter, ATO is not contingent on CBTC – there are lots of ATO systems around the world that don’t use CBTC (e.g., WMATA).
The advantage of ATO? No more overly conservative train operators operating more slowly than necessary or hanging further back than necessary from their leaders. Every train has the same operating style, and it’s one that keeps trains moving as quickly and closely as they safely can.
The disadvantage of ATO? Now the overly conservative automation is keeping the trains behind a safety margin that is further back than the signal system’s safety margin, and generally is making conservative assumptions about conditions. The busiest rapid transit systems in the world (Moscow and Tokyo) don’t use ATO, precisely because those 5 seconds saved by a human driver can make the difference between a 36 tph operation and a 38 tph operation.
Really if I were running the MTA, I’d do an experiment. Try CBTC on one line, track circuit based ATC on another, and maybe an intermittent inductive ATS system on yet another line, and keep the rest of the system in its current state as a control. Then compare how well it works. Besides the 7 and L, a good test line would be Queens Blvd, because it’s busy and all the lines serving it are based out of the Jamaica Yard.
You’re suggesting that the ATO system introduces an additional safety buffer above the underlying CBTC system’s? I don’t think that’s the case.
I’m not familiar with the Moscow or Tokyo systems, but what you’re saying goes against everything I’ve heard, which is that ATO is often used to squeeze every last bit of capacity out of a system. For instance, see this article.
Your idea might be a good one if NYCT had unlimited resources, but, alas, it doesn’t. Besides, I’m not entirely up on my railroad acronymics, but I’m not sure those three things perform analogous functions. ATS (Automatic Train Supervision) is already in place on most of the IRT – it tracks the trains and moves the switches, but the same old signals are still in place, and the same old (and young) train operators operate the trains.
I hope they get a bid from whoever did the Docklands Light Railway signalling. Fully automated driverless operation on a complicated (and frequently altered!) network with fairly high frequencies, and no accidents so far.
When signalling systems are expiring, it’s often worth it to jump to much newer technology — it doesn’t cost much more than replicating the old technology, and it’s quite expensive either way.
Recent news reports indicate that Denmark is replacing its *entire* nationwide railway signalling with ERTMS/ETCS, because its old signalling is reaching end-of-life. ERTMS/ETCS was orignally designed as an overlay on existing systems which would form a ‘new standard’ for European interoperability, to be used on lines with international connections. But because their systems are expiring, they’re going to shift *everything* to it.
Reading the MTA 2008-2013 capital improvement schedule, especially the section on communications. I don’t get the cost of a half billion, page 30. With ten thousand cars, and adding wireless communications to each one computes to about $500 per car, or $5 million. After all, a cell phone cost $50.
Getting to page 47, I see that the replacement of VHF radios come to $224 million. I simply do not see how 10,000 digital radios comes to a quarter billion. It sounds like MTA is trapped with a few vendors who are pricing them way too high, something like $20,000 per radio.
Something is wrong, and that something makes me very suspicious of the plan.
Just for fun I looked up the price for high bandwidth narrow band digital police car systems, they run about $3000-5,000.
Something is wrong in technology pricing in the MTA, an auditor needs to look more closely at these cost break downs.
One stop closer (pun intended) to platform screen doors. Too bad they won’t come until 2016. Then, they could have PSDs like in the Tokyo Metro or the Seoul Subway.