An MTA security camera hangs above the BMT platform at 59th St. and Lexington Ave. (Photo by flickr user Vidiot)

Next week, the MTA Board will vote to approve a sweeping package of service cuts in an effort to close a budget gap hundreds of millions of dollars wide. Amongst those cuts are the planned elimination of 620 station agents. While layoff notices have already gone out to these employees and the cuts will leave stations with the fewest number of staffers in decades, politicians are voicing their concerns about the MTA’s willingness to sacrifice station security in a post-Sept. 11 era.

In fact, just last week, three high-ranking House representatives who overseen homeland security matters sent MTA CEO and Chairman Jay Walder a letter urging him to reconsider the station agent cuts. “Although our domestic transit systems have thus far been spared, deadly terrorist attacks in Spain, Great Britain, India and Russia over the last few years have emphasized the vulnerabilities of public transportation in large urban areas and demonstrated the security challenges unique to these open, passenger-heavy systems,” the letter said. It continued, “These cuts may create gaps in the layered infrastructure of local stations. A human presence is important for securing an open transit environment.”

The letter’s authors make it tough to ignore their message. It came from Bernie G. Thompson, chair of the House Homeland Security Committee and co-signed by Sheila Jackson Lee, chair of the transportation security subcommittee, and Brooklyn’s own Yvette Clark, chair of the subcommittee on emerging threats, and the three noted that the recent guilty plea by Najibullah Zazi thrust domestic terrorism concerns back into the spotlight, a point made last month on one of my recent appearances on the WCBS local news. “The case of Najibullah Zazi is a chilling reminder that our transit systems are targets of Al Qaeda and its affiliates,” they wrote.

For its part, the MTA defended both the planned cuts and the current state of subway security. “The subway system is the safest it’s been in years, thanks to the vigilance and dedication of the N.Y.P.D.,” agency spokesman Aaron Donovan said. “There will continue to be a strong presence of M.T.A. employees throughout the subway system.”

Yet, another story about the MTA’s security cameras betrays the authority’s assurances. According to a report in today’s amNew York, half of the subway system’s 4313 security cameras aren’t working properly. According to Heather Haddon, these cameras “are unable to power up or are suffering from software glitches.”

In the past decade, the MTA has installed cameras across the system at subway turnstiles, platforms and tunnels to combat crime and fare beating. But of the 2,000 cameras that only records footage and are placed around the turnstiles, nearly half aren’t working because they were never fully rigged, MTA spokesman Kevin Ortiz said…

Another 1,100 cameras located throughout the system that would send live feeds and allow officials to monitor activity in real time are not working because of a software glitch, Ortiz said. The MTA is in a legal dispute with the contractor, Lockheed Martin, but the agency is working with another contractor to make them live. Ortiz couldn’t say when the work will be finished.

Considering that the MTA just added closed-circuit cameras to their new R160s, this is a dismaying development. One of the reasons for this security problem is the MTA’s on-going legal fight with Lockheed Martin, most recently highlighted by a state comptroller’s report on subway security. The truth remains, however, that if the MTA is going to get rid of station agents, they have to make sure something else is making the system secure and user friendly.

I’ve doubted the station agents’ ultimate impact as a deterrent because they don’t leave the booths and are under no legal obligation to stop a crime in progress, but people may be deterred just by their simple presence, and as the MTA urges people to say something if they see something, someone has to be there to receive the complaint. The intercoms don’t work; the cameras don’t work; and now the the MTA has politicians concerned with homeland security breathing down its back. For better or worse, the authority can’t sacrifice the safety of its system for the demands of its tenuous budget. The agency needs money, and if the feds are so concerned, they could start to funnel more security dollars to the MTA. It would be a start for sure.

Currently, New York City’s 422 subway stations are staffed by 3000 station agents. These folks are supposed to serve as the eyes and ears of the MTA. They sit in their booths to help passengers in need, assist those who can’t negotiate the turnstiles and, ideally, guard against crime. In a few months, their numbers will drop by 450, and although every station will still be staffed, people will be inconvenienced.

For the MTA, the elimination of station agents should allow them more flexibility. Many of the station agents provide help that can be centralized. For example, if a person in a wheelchair or with a stroller needs to use the emergency exit, that person could readily call an MTA employee at a centralized location who could, with the use of closed-circuit camera technology, verify the need for help and press a button to activate the emergency door. This employee could oversee multiple stations at once, and the agency wouldn’t need to staff the stations with as many people. The same can be down for people who need directions as well.

In fact, the MTA has already been promoting their Customer Assistance Intercoms as solutions for those straphangers who encounter an agent-less station. Bright red signs direct customers to the intercoms, and on the other end should be another station agent who can offer assistance. The problem, reports amNew York’s Heather Haddon is that these intercoms are hard to find and don’t always work.

The subway intercoms that straphangers must increasingly rely on for help have left many riders stumped about how to use them — if they can find them at all. “I’ve never noticed it,” said Queens rider Maryanne Bannon, 58. “Most New Yorkers are not trained for this.”

…In a small survey of straphangers by amNewYork, no one was familiar with the rather cryptic-looking boxes. “They have to come up with a better design. It’s not consumer friendly,” said Karl Kronebusch, 54, a Park Slope rider.

Even MTA CEO Jay Walder recently admitted that he had a hard time finding the intercom in a station he frequents, saying he was “disappointed” by the obscure system. “We’ve almost hidden them away,” Walder said last week.

The boxes also periodically break, with an entire bank of them out recently, union officials said. Furthermore, many stations where the station agents are being removed don’t have the safety devices installed yet, said MTA board member Andrew Albert. “Before we remove booth agents, we should have a method of contacting the police,” Albert said.

Albert’s quote speaks for itself. The MTA has chosen to replace people with a centralized system, but they’ve done so in an obtuse way. Transit needs to install easy-to-see intercom boxes in convenient places, and the agency must ensure that someone is always on the other end. Many college campuses have a blue light phone system, and the MTA should use that visible approach as inspiration.

As more station agents are eliminated, riders may encounter more problems with their commutes. As station agents seemingly field only a handful of requests a shift, it may seem that not many will be inconvenienced, but a few people per day will quickly add up.

The new R160 configuration features seats that can flip up and handholds designed to maximize car space. (Photo courtesy of New York City Transit)

After months of delays and planning, a pair of pilot programs three years in the making are finally coming to fruition along the Queens Boulevard line. A new R160 car set to roll out as an E train will feature four cars equipped with advanced video surveillance equipment and a new car configuration featuring hand poles in new locations and rush-hour flip-up seats. The seats will be locked down for the time being, and Transit does not know when the flip-up feature will be utilized.

For the agency, the announcement that these pilots are live came after years of planning. The MTA first announced plans to install cameras in subway cars as early as March 2007, and in April 2008, Transit said that some R160 at a certain point in the future would play host to the pilot. Last August, Transit again reiterated plans to beef up on-board security, and now, an E train will test run these cameras.

“Video camera systems have clearly been shown to help deter criminal activity on transit vehicles and we believe strongly that they can also be extremely valuable in investigating accident injury claims,” NYC Transit President Thomas F. Prendergast said in a statmeent. “But we must also acknowledge the potential threat of terrorist activity on public transportation vehicles and CCTV has been instrumental in helping with investigations in this area.”

Transit started a one-year evaluation period today and offered a few details behind their plans. Four cars in a ten-car set will be equipped with four cameras each for a total of 16. Each set of four cameras is linked into one DVR system, and the four cameras are tied into a network controller unit that transmits the signals between cars. The cameras are placed to “effectively cover the passenger area,” according to Transit, and while the agency stressed that the cameras are for recording purposes and not live monitoring, it’s unclear how Transit plans to make use of the footage. Each car with a camera in it will feature a decal, seen here at right.

“The CCTV System will be evaluated for its recording quality and car-to-car transmission of video signals within the subway environment,” Steven Feil, Senior Vice President, Department of Subways, said. “Upon successful completion of the testing and evaluation of the system, NYC Transit may consider implementing the CCTV System throughout the subway fleet.”

Meanwhile, while the camera pilot will be live, the MTA’s other long-term plan — flip seats designed to maximize rush hour standing space — will be an option in a new R160 along the E but won’t be activated in the foreseeable future. The history of this plan is nearly as drawn out as that of the CCTV’s. Transit announced a seatless train experiment in early 2008, and while Boston’s MBTA started its own pilot in December 2008, Transit’s plan stalled out when Kawasaki refused to retrofit an R142 for use along the East Side IRT.

The new car, as the photo above shows, will feature flip seats and a better handhold configuration. If Transit decides to flip up the seats for any rush hour, the car’s capacity will increase by 19 percent. However, Transit says that “deployment of this feature is not being considered at this time.” In the meantime, the new pole locations should improve passenger flow and encourage riders to toward the middle of crowded subway cars. Today, with poles close to the doors, those riders who stand tend to block flow and empty space in the middle of cars often goes unused.

As part of his ongoing series of progress reports into the MTA’s attempts at beefing up its security, New York State Comptroller Thomas DiNapoli has released his most scathing indictment of the transit agency so far. A new report, released yesterday, says that the MTA is years behind implementing its planned post-9/11 security upgrades and may very well run out of money before completing the project.

“The MTA is struggling to bring the security of its system into the 21st Century, but the project is taking too long, costing too much, and there is no end in sight,” DiNapoli said. “The transit system is safer than before September 11, 2001, due in large part to the efforts of the MTA Police Department, but some security improvements are years behind schedule and the electronic security program may never be completed.”

The report — available here as a PDF — pegs increasing costs and a dispute with contractor Lockheed Martin as the two culprits behind the MTA’s security failures. Originally slated to cost $591 million, the project is now is estimated to run to at least $833 million. To make matters worse, the MTA has only $59 million left in allocations, and the agency will not, as DiNapoli put it, be able to “complete the project as originally envisioned.”

Meanwhile, as DiNapoli details, many of the MTA’s struggles with the security program have stemmed from a contract dispute with Lockheed Martin, the original contractor, that has led to two concurrent lawsuits. Here’s how DiNapoli sums it up:

The DiNapoli report details the problems the MTA has encountered with its electronic security program, which was being managed by Lockheed Martin (Lockheed). The contract called for the installation of video cameras and electronic sensors, including motion detectors, access control devices, and intelligent video routed through regional command and control centers. While two MTA operating agencies are now receiving some benefits from the electronic security program, three others are lagging far behind and there is no target date to complete the project, which was to be completed in August 2008.

In April 2009, Lockheed filed suit seeking to terminate its contract alleging scheduling problems and other obstacles. Several rooms where work was to be done reportedly had water infiltration and inadequate electricity; and none were equipped with computer network access. Lockheed is suing for at least $138 million and the MTA’s countersuit seeks $92 million.

Despite this bad news, DiNapoli praises the MTA for forging ahead with most of the project. The agency’s bridges and tunnels are more secure, and the Long Island Rail Road has implemented an electronic monitoring system. But the city’s buses and subways remain vulnerable.

Still, the MTA plans to spend what little money it has left on incremental upgrades and has defended its efforts in a statement. “Ensuring the safety and security of our customers continues to be the MTA’s top priority. As the Comptroller’s report indicates, we have made significant improvements to our security structure, a system that includes the hardening of our infrastructure, strategic policing and customer awareness,” the MTA said. “The MTA has asserted Lockheed’s failure to perform and its breach of contract. However, we are not waiting for the outcome of ongoing litigation to secure our transit network and will finish the project with available funds. Additionally, we have already installed more than 2,300 cameras in our subways alone and will continue our efforts to provide real-time alarms and situational awareness at key facilities.”

In the end, the subways remain vulnerable to an attack, and the MTA is facing the reality of spiraling costs and a depleted fiscal reserve. Hopefully, the authority can adequately secure its system before something happens.

Outside the new Atlantic Ave. LIRR terminal building in Brooklyn, security bollards double as benches but leave little room for anything else. (Photo by Benjamin Kabak)

When the new terminal building at Atlantic Ave. in Brooklyn, critics and columnists praised the light and airy nature of the building. Featuring a seemless integration of art and architecture, the new terminal building is representative of the MTA’s current approach toward offering its customers a convenient and mostly state-of-the-art facilities when it opens new structures. Outside, though, the security bollards tell a different story, one of overreaction and blocked sidewalks to a public structure that needs to be able to handle heavy pedestrian flow.

When the new building first opened, attention was focused on the inside, but the security bollards, shown above, drew some warranted criticisms. Gersh Kuntzman in The Brooklyn Paper was particular critical of their appearance and size. He noted the bunker-like mentality of the security measures and called the giant bollards “14 mammoth concrete coffins that give the beautiful new facility the look of an outpost in the Green Zone.”

I ventured to the new terminal last week to snap some pictures and saw first hand the problem of the bollards. These things are massive. They take up the entire sidewalk and ring from one entrance to another. With little space between them, people are finding it hard to navigate, and anyone with bags or strollers will be out of luck. When trains let out and commuters come pouring out of the building to head to Fort Greene, pedestrian congestion too becomes an issue. As a security measure, these bollards are woefully in everone’s faces and serve as a stark reminder of the threat of terrorism.

This afternoon, Streetsblog took a tape measure to the bollards and found them to go well beyond the NYPD recommendations for security measures. While police handbooks recommend four feet of space in between bollards and a height no greater than 36 inches, these granite slabs are over 50 inches high and have less than 3.5 feet of space between them. As some serve as benches too — a last-gasp attempt to make them functional — their widths are tremendous as well.

So far, no one has laid claim to the design. The Empire State Development Corporation is notoriously tight-lipped with its plans, and the architects, the MTA and NYPD haven’t yet responded to Streetsblog’s request for clarification. The bollards were not, however, in the original design for the building.

The specter of terrorism and counterterrorist measures make for uncomfortable subjects. New York City’s subways are notoriously porous, and New Yorkers try not to dwell on the ways our city has become a target for America’s enemies. Still, these bollards do nothing to make a new train terminal accessible or user-friendly. They exacerbate fears about our safety while blocking the city’s sidewalks and its transit access points. There are tasteful ways to guard against terrorism, and then there are these granite blocks, seemingly dropped from a quarry onto Flatbush Ave. with no regard for purpose or appearance.

In 1980, through the first eight months of the year, the crime-riddled New York City subway system witnessed 15 murders, up from ten over the first eight months of 1979. Saturday morning’s murder on the D train was just the second such incident of 2009. It’s no wonder, then, that three days later, the city’s news outlets are still buzzing with features and stories about the underground killing.

While we explored the lessons riders could learn from this murder, the police response to an on-board crime in a subway car filled with people has led to some debate as well. After Gerardo Sanchez allegedly stabbed Dwight Johnson and the subway conductor and police were alerted to the crime, the subway car doors were sealed. Passengers were left inside with the killer for a few minutes until police could secure the area to ensure that Sanchez would not be able to escape.

Yesterday, facing some criticism over the decision to leave innocent bystanders in a car with a knife-wielding killer, NYPD Commissioner Tom Kelly defended the decision:

Kelly said the NYPD took the right steps early Saturday morning to contain Gerardo Sanchez, a Bronx man accused of stabbing Dwight Johnson to death over a subway seat on the D train. “They [the passengers] pulled the alarm, they stopped the train between stations. As a result of that, when the train pulled into the station, officers were there, they got on the train and arrested the individual,” Kelly said.

The decision to keep all of the train doors locked except one while police took a few additional minutes to arrest the alleged killer as about 30 horrified passengers looked on was met with questions about police policy and procedure..

Mayor Michael Bloomberg said the train was immediately met by police — and he dismissed questions that police left passengers locked in the subway car with a murderer — again noting that a passenger had pulled the emergency cord that had briefly stopped the train in the tunnel. He said police boarded the train through one open door in the front as soon as it was in the station. “Opening all doors and letting everybody run in every direction and having a murderer back out on the streets doesn’t make a lot of sense to me,” he said..

Meanwhile, the Daily News did one of its person-on-the-street stories, and those quotes featured for print all were critical of the decision. Just one person — a lawyer, to boot — defended the MTA. “It shows people in the future that if you commit a crime on the train, you’re going to get caught,” Leo Genn said. “My instinct is they did the right thing.”

The Post takes a more critical approach. The problem, the paper alleges, stemmed from the person who decided to pull the emergency brake. In a statement to Gothamist, Charles Seaton clarified Transit’s view on the pulling cord. “Use the emergency cord only to prevent an accident or injury…” the Transit spokesman said. “But if your train is between stations and someone aboard becomes ill, do not pull the emergency cord. The train will stop, preventing medical professionals from reaching the sick passenger. A sick person is better off if the train goes to the nearest station where police and medical services will be waiting or can be quickly summoned, without interruption.”

With crime down in the subways, riders are accustomed to police responses and emergency brake procedures. Murders almost never happen underground these days, and the attention this one has garnered is just proof positive of the progress the city has made in combating subway crime over the last 30 years. I think the police acted expeditiously to catch a killer, and I hope the 20-30 people in the D train on Saturday morning recognize that. Still, it must have been one terrifying experience.