Over the last few months, we’ve heard a lot about the MTA’s efforts at securing its system. A ongoing lawsuit against Lockheed Martin has left the current state of subway security in disarray, and approximately half of the system’s 4300 cameras do not work properly. Had everything gone according to plan, by now, the entire subway system would have been outfitted with closed-circuit security cameras.
Generally, this halting attempt at installing cameras doesn’t impact the public. We’ll ride the trains no matter what and hope for the best. But this weekend, two stories highlight both the benefits and limitations of subway security cameras. The first happened right here in New York when a stabbing on Sunday morning left two riders dead and the cops on the hunt for a killer. The NYPD’s efforts have been slowed by the lack of adequate security measures underground.
As Ray Rivera and Michael Grynbaum write in The Times today, Christopher St. — the station through which the alleged perp escaped — has no cameras, and overall, the system’s video surveillance system “remains a patchwork of lifeless cameras, unequipped stations and problem-plagued wiring.”
MTA and New York City officials are aware of the system’s shortcomings. “This definitely should have been recorded on surveillance camera,” Norman Seabrook, head of the MTA’s security committee, said to The Times “Post-9/11, the terrorist bombings that just occurred in Moscow, the two murders that just occurred plus other incidents that continue to occur in the subway system, we cannot wait any longer to ensure the safety of the public.”
Yet, the Moscow bombings, despite Seabrook’s concern, highlight just how useless security cameras can be. During the Monday morning rush hour, two suicide bombers detonated explosives in the Moscow Metro. The bombers are suspected to be a part of some Northern Caucasus separatist groups, and the blasts raised fears through Russia and the rest of the world.
In New York, the NYPD rushed to “activate” a security plan, Reuters reported on Monday. Police details flooded the subway system, and squads were dispatched to major transit hubs around the city. Although there was no suspected link between America’s enemies and the Russian attackers, the city wanted to maintain a strong security footing. It was, MTA spokesman Jeremy Soffin said to amNew York, a “precaution.”
Yet, I wonder if this response is more an example of wishful thinking and the limitations we run up against in defending an open and porous subway system than it is of precaution. By dispatching police after the fact, it is as though security officials are trying to close the barn door after the horse escaped. As former NYPD commissioner Howard Safir said to Heather Haddon, “There are so many entrances, so many stations, so many people. It’s virtually impossible to guarantee that it won’t be vulnerable.”
So where then does that leave New Yorkers on a daily basis? On the one hand, a killer is still at large because he was able to slip out of an unsecured subway system after stabbing two or three men on a subway train car that is surveillance-free. On the other, we are aware of the security risks we face as we ride the trains and now that, while exceedingly rare, a terrorist attack underground can be a devastating and tragic event. As station agents vanish and security dollars languish, the MTA must do what it can to guard against both kinds of subway attacks.
7 comments
“The NYPD’s efforts have been slowed by the lack of adequate security measures underground”
I fundamentally disagree with your assumption here– that simply because cameras COULD HAVE helped solve a crime, that their absence signals an “inadequacy” in the security apparatus. That obviously can’t be true, or else the only “adequate” system would be cameras everywhere, tracking devices on every person, etc.
Now, I imagine what you may mean/think is that, when balancing security and liberty, cameras in subways clearly fall on the side of security (after all, we have no “right” to go on the subway anonymously (our MetroCards, linked to our Credit Cards belie our movements, roughly, around the five boroughs).
The NYPD has the most advanced local intelligence/counter-terrorism units in the world. But as Safir indicated, it is essentially impossible to ward off a subway bomb attack over the long run. Many security analysts have said that the question is not IF a subway bombing will occur in New York, but WHEN. What is important to recognize is that the fact that an attack will occur does not mean that the security apparatus failed. Indeed, to the contrary, it is an indication that we value our open, democratic society so much that we are willing to literally risk life and limb to maintain it (even with the knowledge that additional security measures would reduce said risk).
Lastly, let me say that I am not “against” cameras in subways because of some Big Brother macro-ideological crusade. If New Yorkers decide that cameras in subways are needed tools, and are willing to pay for them, all I will ask is that we carefully draft a set of rules/regulations pertaining to the images, who has access to them, how long they are stored, what they may be used for (felonies/terrorism, not feet-on-seats), and harsh penalties for violations of said rules.
Unless the cameras are being monitored by actual humans 24/7, all they can do is point out possible perpetrators after the fact. Even so, an average human can only simultaneously monitor roughly 10 screens for 10 minute before they start to miss things. Thus, they need to rotate tasks to limit mental fatigue, similar to how life guards will rotate positions at a large pool facility. This requires a huge monitoring staff, something the MTA can hardly afford right now.
Having worked alongside the security designers that keep convicted criminals inside NY’s state prisons, cameras are not the end all, be all of security. Their security systems use sensors that alert someone to pay attention to a camera. But they still have dozens of guards on duty at the points where it matters. As an electrical engineer I can say that there are some things technology is good at, like alerting someone about an open emergency exit gate, but identifying potential criminals before they do something is still something that only another human being can do.
This massive show of force that the NYPD put on yesterday was nothing more than security theater. They weren’t actually going to prevent anything from happening. They were there to show that they exist and to “reassure the public”. In a few days, the system will go back to being just as porous and unattended as usual. There really isn’t anything that any of us can do to stop a crazy fanatic (Muslim or Christian Conservative or any other fanatic for that matter) bent on setting off a bomb in the subway or some mentally unstable individual from stabbing people. These are risks that we’re just going to have to accept as part of our daily lives and just get on with things. You’re way more likely to get hit by a car and killed while crossing the streets in Manhattan, trying to get to that subway entrance that isn’t closed due to budget cuts than by some nut job with a bomb or a knife.
In a few days, the system will go back to being just as porous and unattended as usual.
I don’t think the purpose was to indefinitely ward off Moscow or Tokyo-style attacks – everyone knows that it is entirely possible for someone, someday to succeed in such an act in any city in the world (well, probably not Pyongyang, but… seperate issue); instead, the purpose was to ensure that NYC wasn’t about to be the victim of a co-ordinated attack in the way that Mumbai was. The risk of that was probably not particularly high (maybe even “remote” would be a fair description), but given the scope of the danger, I think an immediate short-term escalation of security is entirely justifiable. It wouldn’t prevent such a thing from taking place next week, but at the time it was not known who the attackers were (hell, it’s still not, but everyone assumes that it’s associated with the civil unrest in Chechnya, and they’re probably right) and I don’t see the problem with NYPD taking steps to at least ensure that there was not an ongoing act of terrorism.
Having said that, I’m sure that all parties involved are enormously relieved that the only effect the force escalation had was to deter purse-snatching at major transfer stations ;p.
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