In this April 1, 2010 photo, NYPD transit officer Robert McMillan watches the subway tunnel on video monitors from the Omega booth at the Borough Hall station in the borough of Brooklyn, in New York. (AP Photo/Mary Altaffer)
As details have emerged about the planned attack on the New York City subway led by Najibullah Zazi, I haven’t focused too closely on the story. For one, few people like to be reminded of the dangers we face everyday as we ride a very porous subway system. For another, although the FBI stopped this potential terrorist attack four days before it was set to be put in motion, law enforcement had the situation under control for months. We can’t let fear rule our lives when governmental agencies are doing their jobs properly.
The story, generally, is this: Zazi, a legal permanent resident of the United States, had trained with al-Qaeda for a while in Pakistan. While there, he had met a few other United States natives, and he and his followers had put in motion a plan to attack the New York City subways. This week, details of the plans emerged in the Daily News, and they are chilling:
Zazi and his two Queens friends allegedly planned to strap explosives to their bodies and split up, heading for the Grand Central and Times Square stations – the two busiest subway stations in New York City.
They would board trains on the 1, 2, 3 and 6 lines at rush hour and planned to position themselves in the middle of the packed trains to ensure the maximum carnage when they blew themselves up, sources said.
During Zazi’s brief visit to Queens from his home in Denver last September, he rode the subway multiple times to the Grand Central and Wall St. stations, scouting where to best spread death and mayhem, the sources said.
Terrorist experts estimated that these attacks would have been more deadly than any of the previous train bombings, and it’s hard to guess how damage along the IRT lines would have impacted the oldest tunnels in the city. Yet, despite these fears, Scotland Yard question the limitations of underground surveillance cameras, the public perception is one of risk. We hope today isn’t the day someone detonates a bomb in the subways.
In a more comforting look at security underground, though, the AP explored how the NYPD is pursuing a counterterrorism strategy when it comes to the subways. The AP notes that the NYPD uses “bomb-sniffing dogs, high-tech explosive detection devices and security cameras” as well as good old fashioned manpower in booths that sit in stations next to the various tunnels that cross from Manhattan to the outer boroughs.
Still, the Zazi story makes me believe that maybe the NYPD isn’t doing as much it could. According to a few sources, Zazi and his co-conspirators would have taken their explosives in backpacks. Perhaps, the NYPD back checks should be reconsidered. Perhaps it’s just impossible to stop someone determined enough to attack a vast and open subway system.
In a way, much of our subway security is based upon hope. We hope a terrorist slips up. We hope the FBI or Homeland Security is paying attention to the right warning signs. We hope no one is asleep at the proverbial wheel. It might be the most comforting thought, but at times, it’s all we have.
15 comments
Get ready for long lines at the turnstile.
The coolest part of the AP story was that one of the emergency exits from one of the East River tunnels leads to a false-front “brownstone” in Brooklyn. The NYPD wouldn’t let the AP tell where the house is, for obvious reasons, but how sweet is that!
The “war on terror” is a war fought by intelligence, and in this and other instances, it appears to be, with some exceptions, working. In spite of the fact that “we’re fighting them there,” we’re still fighting them here. So long as the intelligence community remains alert and robust, the main thrust of the fight is taken care of.
I would like to see, however, more random backpack searches. In MacWade v. Kelly, the case challenging random subway backpack searches, that court cited United States v. Green, where the 5th Circuit Judge noted that random searches… “provide[] a gauntlet, random as it is, that persons bent on mischief must traverse.” When potential terrorists see their plans challenged, as a general matter, they panic and delay or cancel their heinous plans. Getting caught or failing is their greatest concern. I believe that more frequent backpack and luggage searches would substantially help thwart the risk of terror in our subways.
Neither the 5th Circuit nor the 2nd Circuit presented ANY social science evdience supporting the “gauntlet” theory. There is no evidence that terrorists do not follow through with plots after having their plans changed by the actions of law enforcement– indeed, the 9/11 hijackers faced many obstacles, including the failure of potential hijackers to enter the U.S., and the arrest of the alleged 20th hijacker in the days leading up to 9/11.
MacWade may be the correct decision, but if it is, it is because people have no reasonable right to privacy on subways, or, at the very least, their right to privacy is overwhelmed by the public’s interest in securing mass transit (as is the case at airports).
The public’s interest in securing mass transit would probably involve getting the government to modernize the ventilation systems. In terms of security provided per dollar spent, having the police harass people who look Middle Eastern is way down the list.
That’s not exactly responsive to my statement. Ventilation helps in the event of an attack, it doesn’t prevent an attack, and the random bag searches actually have not turned out to be frought with racial profiling, though certainly that is a risk of such a vague program.
Actually, the bag searches have had racial profiling. For example, compare the percentage of drug searches of blacks and Hispanics with the percentage of blacks and Hispanics among illegal drug users.
Ventilation is a numbers game. You’d much rather cut the death toll from an attack by a factor of 10 than institute a policy that has less than 90% chance of preventing an attack.
The only effective way to make the searches work is to search every single person at every entrance. Anything less is “security theater”, i.e. just for show.
According to a few sources, Zazi and his co-conspirators would have taken their explosives in backpacks. Perhaps, the NYPD back checks should be reconsidered.
The cost would be astronomical, as you’d need to check at every entrance to every station. There are 468 stations, many with multiple ways to get in.
And you’d have to institute a carry-on bag check system resembling an airport. There are millions of bags carried on the subway every day, any of which theoretically could carry enough weapons or explosives to do horrific damage.
Zazie dans le métro?
Using dogs like these in the heaviest-traveled stations could be a good strategy, though expensive at $20,000 a pup
http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/04/.....gs/?hpt=C1
Everyone in Brooklyn Heights knows where that brownstone is. It’s not exactly a secret.
There is no cost effective way to guarantee security against terrorism on the subway. We can’t pay for the operational infrastructure as it is, let alone pay for all of the security arrangements politicians and the something–must–be–done crowd desire.
The thing to remember is these are psychological attacks. Attacking the 1/2/6 at rush hour? You’ll definitely kill/maim many people. But you’re not going to do much more than temporary damage to the physical system.
I don’t know how you effectively counteract the psychological effects though. The goal is to scare people from taking the train.
I wasn’t in NY when the guy firebombed the train in the 1990s — was there much drop–off in ridership? Any?
One thing you could do in larger stations, have spesific entry & exit points for traffic flow. I don’t think that would fly do to station congestion issues & misperseptions by the riding public.
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